The common law vestige of “breaking” as an element in the crime of burglary no longer need to be shown. McNeeley v. State, 81 Nev. 663, 409 P.2d 135, 1965 Nev. LEXIS 286 (Nev. 1965).
A common-law breaking is not an essential element of the crime of burglary; this section requires only an entry with the intent to commit larceny or other felony. State v. Adams, 94 Nev. 503, 581 P.2d 868, 1978 Nev. LEXIS 599 (Nev. 1978).
Evidence held insufficient.
Evidence was insufficient to support convictions for burglary and fraudulent use of a credit card because none of the receipts introduced into evidence were from the particular store on the particular date alleged in the complaint; the circumstantial evidence, including other receipts, was sufficient to support convictions relating to other particular transactions, as well as a conviction for using the personal identification of another. Jezdik v. State, 121 Nev. 129, 110 P.3d 1058, 121 Nev. Adv. Rep. 15, 2005 Nev. LEXIS 16 (Nev. 2005).
Insufficient showing of entry.
An information charging that defendant did wilfully, intentionally, feloniously, and burglariously enter the open portion of a pickup truck with the intent then and there to commit larceny, did not charge the defendant with the commission of the felony of burglary, as holding one’s hand over the open platform body of a truck with intent to commit larceny did not constitute the entry of a vehicle. Smith v. First Judicial Dist. Court, 75 Nev. 526, 347 P.2d 526, 1959 Nev. LEXIS 188 (Nev. 1959).
Sufficient showing of entry.
Stealing tool box from the bed of a truck, and breaking into a cab and stealing a radio constituted entering. Jimenez v. State, 105 Nev. 337, 775 P.2d 694, 1989 Nev. LEXIS 68 (Nev. 1989).
Evidence that defendant had entered his former girlfriend’s trailer, ransacked the trailer, and taken her social security card and car keys was sufficient to support his burglary conviction. Chappell v. State, 114 Nev. 1403, 972 P.2d 838, 114 Nev. Adv. Rep. 148, 1998 Nev. LEXIS 162 (Nev. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 853, 120 S. Ct. 318, 145 L. Ed. 2d 114, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5536 (U.S. 1999).
Whether defendants entered a building with the specific intent to commit larceny once inside was a question for the jury to decide based upon the circumstances connected with the perpetration of the offense. Crane v. State, 88 Nev. 684, 504 P.2d 12, 1972 Nev. LEXIS 559 (Nev. 1972).
Under this section consent to entry was not a defense, so long as the defendant was shown to have made the entry with larcenous intent. Thomas v. State, 94 Nev. 605, 584 P.2d 674, 1978 Nev. LEXIS 629 (Nev. 1978).
The authority to enter a building open to the public extends only to those who enter with a purpose consistent with the reason the building is open. A criminal intent formulated after a lawful entry will not satisfy the statute. On the other hand, an entry with intent to commit larceny cannot be said to be within the authority granted customers of a business establishment. Indeed, even if a consensual entry is implied, it is not a defense to a charge of burglary against one who is shown to have made a simple entry with larcenous intent. State v. Adams, 94 Nev. 503, 581 P.2d 868, 1978 Nev. LEXIS 599 (Nev. 1978).
Specific description of intended felony or theft not required.
Since the primary concern in a burglary indictment is with the unlawful entry, the intended felony or theft need not therein be described with the same specificity that might be required in charging the offense of larceny or another felony; thus, an information which charged the defendants with burglariously entering a building with intent to commit larceny therein was not defective for failing to specify either grand larceny or petit larceny. Bullis v. State, 83 Nev. 175, 426 P.2d 423, 1967 Nev. LEXIS 249 (Nev. 1967).
Charge struck for lack of felonious intent.
Where defendants were charged with burglary and attempted murder and the state predicated the necessary felonious intent, supporting the burglary charge, on the attempted murder charge, when the attempted murder charge was struck, the burglary charge was fatally defective as drafted and should also have been struck. Sheriff, Clark County v. Hicks, 89 Nev. 78, 506 P.2d 766, 1973 Nev. LEXIS 423 (Nev. 1973).
Entry with loaded firearm.
Where defendant entered his former workplace to ask for his job back with at least one loaded firearm in his possession, the evidence was sufficient to support a burglary conviction. Thomas v. State, 114 Nev. 1127, 967 P.2d 1111, 114 Nev. Adv. Rep. 122, 1998 Nev. LEXIS 134 (Nev. 1998), cert. denied, 528 U.S. 830, 120 S. Ct. 85, 145 L. Ed. 2d 72, 1999 U.S. LEXIS 5186 (U.S. 1999).
Instruction on burglarious intent proper.
District court did not abuse its discretion by giving a jury instruction on burglarious intent because the instruction essentially quoted the statute and used permissive rather than mandatory language, and it did not relieve the State of its burden to prove each element of burglary. Olivera v. State, 2016 Nev. App. LEXIS 238 (Nev. Ct. App. May 31, 2016).